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Abstract. Politicians understand that a conventional double dividend policy - defined as
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and unemployment through taxation of energy and CO2
emissions and subsidization of wage costs - and the aim of keeping international competitiveness
of all sectors intact may be  mutually exclusive concepts at least as long as internationally
coordinated solutions are not available. It is suggested that a double dividend policy that aims
at reducing GHG emissions and unemployment without a direct violation of international
competitiveness has to tax energy use and CO2 emissions of households and should use the
revenues to subsidize investment in energy or pollution-saving technologies to reduce investment
costs of firms. Thereby reduction of energy coefficients is achieved together with lowers costs
and prices of goods. This is an increase in competitiveness and employment in an
environmentally friendly way and may induce other parts of the world to participate in GHG
emission reduction policies or speed up the achievement of an internationally cooperative
solution. According to this proposal the principle of causation has to be dropped in part
nationally but not internationally. Using these positive incentives, competitiveness of sectors will
only be affected through indirect general equilibrium effects.
* This paper is a revised version of Chapter 4 of "Energy Technologies, Environmental Policy
and Competitiveness", Final Report for JOULE II programme of the European Commission DG
XII (F.1) by Paul Diederen, René Kemp, Perry Verberne, Thomas Ziesemer and Adriaan van
Zon, MERIT, University of Limburg, May 1995. I would like to thank Paul Diederen, Marcel
Janssen, René Kemp, Michael Kohlhaas, Hans van Meijl, Barbara Praetorius, Luc Soete, Perry
Verberne and Adriaan van Zon. Seminar participants at the DIW Berlin and the session
participants at the 'Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik' in Linz/Austria, especially the
discussant Peter Michaelis, have been very helpful. Moreover, I would like to thank two
anonymous but not unanimous referees for urging for more rigour, brevity and simplification at
the same time. Where the paper has been shortened the reader will be referred to the working
paper version at “http://www-edocs.unimaas.nl/abs/mer95022.htm”. Responsibility for views and
opinions expressed is entirely mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the DG XII or the
persons mentioned above. Appendices are available at http://meritbbs.unimaas.nl, Research
Memoranda 2000.      
1The only exception seems to be Switzerland. Britain has shut down its coal industry and
Eastern Europe as well as former GDR have closed many industries but these actions where not
undertaken because of the Rio agreement. (The Economist, Oct. 11, 1997)
     
2See Jacoby, Prinn and Schmalensee (1998) for a critical evaluation of the Kyoto protocol.
     
3See Vermeend and van der Vaart (1997) on the Dutch concepts and Jacoby, Prinn and
Schmalensee (1998) on the US concept.
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1. Introduction
In the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro countries agreed on
a reduction of CO2 emissions to 85% of the 1990 level. By 1995 almost no action
1 has been
undertaken as a result because of the Rio agreement. Therefore, at the first conference of parties
to the Climate convention held in Berlin 1995 it was agreed to seek legally binding targets. The
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change was expected to achieve this. Did it?
The good news from Kyoto was that other greenhouse gases not considered in previous
conventions and an enhancement of the CO2 absorption capacity will be taken into account in
future negotiations. This bears some potential to make solutions, if any, less costly (see Michaelis
1999). However, monitoring problems will not become smaller when they are included.
The bad news was that developing countries will not take part and that the US
government is not willing to send the Kyoto protocol to the Senate for ratification until
developing nations commit to 'substantial participation' which they currently are not willing to
do.
2 Action is postponed again, raising the question what can be done?
As it stands, an international solution with tradable permits does not seem to be feasible
politically, mainly because of difficulties in allocating the initial rights and monitoring emissions.
Similarly, an internationally coordinated tax solution suggested by Cooper (1998) is not
likely, since other tax and subsidy policies would have to be coordinated by them to avoid an
undermining of an agreement (tax carbon, subsidies coal). This requires to surrender countries‘
sovereignty, an idea that none will not accept (see Eizenstat 1998). 
  The EU and its member states reject the idea of national or EU taxation for fear of losing
of international competitiveness. 
In short, neither internationally traded permits nor internationally coordinated taxes or
national tax approaches seem to become a political equilibrium in the near future. The current
political equilibrium may, however, be one of positive incentives as used by the Dutch and the
US governments subsidizing the adoption of environmentally sound technologies.
3 However, the
corresponding economic equilibrium is not explained conceptually anywhere. In this paper we
will explain it using the EC proposal as a starting point. The argument essentially is that the
concept is good as long as the other solutions, in particular the internationally coordinated ones
are not available. The money invested in this concept so far is insufficient. 
The EC proposal for GHG-emission reduction suggests (among other things) the level     
4Pirttilä (1999) has made a start to systematically integrate the issues of policy, compensation,
earmarking and  environmental taxes.
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of taxation of $10 per barrel of oil equivalent with exemptions for energy-intensive industries.
Moreover, international competitiveness of firms and unemployment should not be reduced. How
taxes should be rebated, however, is an issue left open until now.
4 Reduction of existing
distortionary taxes and subsidies for wage costs have been proposed. Here we argue that
subsidies for investment into energy-saving technologies may be a superior way of revenue
rebatement that supports the environmental, employment and competitiveness goals. It takes
international competitiveness requirements into account right from the beginning instead of
making concepts which require exemptions.
We introduce fixed costs and induced energy savings into an economic model with
environmental policy. We use a modification of the monopolistic competition model developed
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which is now ell-established in the theories of industrial
organization, international trade, economic growth and other parts of macroeconomics. The
reason is that we prefer a framework suitable for differentiated products over one for
homogeneous products; the evidence (see Hall 1988, 1990, Morrison 1989, 1990, 1992 and
section 6 of the WP version of this paper) does not contrast the Chamberlinian model of
monopolistic competition: At the macro-level and that of highly aggregated sectors profits turn
out to be approximately zero. In monopolistic competition models fixed costs limit the number
of firms and there is monopolistic price setting. Environmental taxes induce changes of marginal
costs and lead to price changes. We allow for many consumption goods. Each variant is assumed
to be produced by only one firm which therefore is also the only exporter in the world. The model
is extended by Pissaridis’ (1990, Chap.1) search unemployment model and with an
energy-environment part to analyse the international competitiveness of energy producers and
users and the effects on unemployment when environmental policy encourages energy-saving
technologies and subsidizes wages. As this paper is concerned with 'what happens in the next ten
years after the introduction of an environmental policy', we do not treat technology as an
endogenous R&D variable because the lag from invention to marketing is typically more than
ten years in many cases. This means that energy savings for the next ten years will have to be
achieved with technologies that are available now. Investment in energy-saving technologies,
perhaps of the retrofitting type, constitutes the only form of endogenous technology choice in the
model. However, it is easy to imagine that an increase in demand for these technologies increases
the incentive for R&D in this field.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we set up a model which will
guide the analysis. In section 3 we show that the impact effects of energy and C02 taxes under
the EC proposal and subsidies for investment in energy-saving technologies will be rather limited
in spite of the sensitivity of the results with respect to the price elasticities of demand and the
level of the tax. In section 4 we examine the decision of the firm, with emphasis on endogenous
technology choice reducing energy coefficients through investment in energy-saving
technologies, which lowers energy coefficients. In section 5 we argue that a policy that leaves
international competitiveness unaffected has to make sure that marginal costs are not increased
by taxes. A double dividend or double benefit defined as environmental benefit cum
unemployment reduction can be obtained without losses in competitiveness if the revenues from     
5In section 7 of the WP, investment dynamics are considered. It is shown that energy and CO2
taxes have a negative impact on investment in the capital stock and on employment whereas
subsidies on investment in energy-saving technologies have a positive impact on employment,
the environment and international competitiveness. As the model has been changed into a static
one this section is dropped here.
     
6This assumption will have no impact on the issues treated in the paper  as long as optimal
















 1,..., r; im 
 r  1,...,r ￿  r
(1)
energy and C02 taxes are rebated as subsidies for investment in energy-saving technologies.
5
Section 6 shows the general equilibrium effects of subsidies on energy-coefficients,
unemployment and competitiveness. Section 7 briefly summarizes the argument in a
self-contained manner. The reader who is not particularly interested in modelling and technical
details can jump to it immediately.
2. Specification of the model
The model set up in this section serves several purposes. Firstly, it disciplines the line of thought
of this paper. Secondly, it is the basis for some quantifications in later sections. Thirdly, it makes
the incentive effects from taxes and subsidies on investment in energy-saving technologies,
unemployment and monopolistic inefficiencies explicit.
Assumptions on preferences of households are described by the following utility function
Consumption consists of deliveries from all sectors,  . Some consumer goods,  , may be ci cim
imported indirectly. The utility function is of the CES type with respect to the consumer goods
and of the ln-type with respect to the environment E. The environmental part of (1) - where l is
a country index and the summation over countries reflects global pollution - has marginal utility
such that it moves quicker towards infinity if E goes to zero than marginal utility of   and  ci cim
moves to infinity if   and   go towards zero. In Soete and Ziesemer (1997) this was a ci cim
necessary assumption to ensure that the environmental tax is positive in the optimum. The
positivity problem arises from the inefficiency of monopolistic prices under monopolistic
competition. Monopolistic production is lower than optimum production and therefore c.p.
should be increased. However, pollution is an argument in favour of reducing output. In the
present context it is widely agreed that the environmental tax, whatever its form, should be
positive. To make sure that this is a result in general equilibrium and central optimum
considerations it was necessary to make the environmental part steeper in marginal utility. Utility
function (1) is assumed to reflect the implicit preferences of politicians who favour
environmental policy over anti-monopoly policy and material wealth. 
6 Export demand can either
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imported goods, or, alternatively, from a demand function with constant price elasticities.
Production of domestically produced goods,  , is assumed to have labour  requirements xi
where f-terms represent fixed costs and a-terms variable costs. a-terms could be endogenized to
allow for substitution, which means that they are a function of factor prices. Because of the fixed
costs it is advantageous for each firm that enters the market to produce a new variant and not to
enter any other firms’ market. Therefore each good is produced in one country only. This is the
perfect specialization result known from international trade models with differentiated goods.
Technologies of the Energy-Environment complex 
Energy is also used as an input by firms in proportion to their output  : xi
The indices i = 1, ..., r are subdivided as follows: non-energy intermediates i = 1, ..., e-1; energy
delivering i = e and energy-saving intermediates i = r. For simplicity we consider only one form
of energy and one form of retrofitting measures.
Through investment in energy-saving technologies, i = r, the firms i may reduce energy
demand coefficients:
The interpretation of equation (5) is that the coefficients of energy demand, which differ among
firms, are reduced by using energy-saving inputs, i = r. Households are assumed not to change
technologies with respect to energy consumption. But they may reduce energy consumption by
investing in retrofitting measures, which are well known to improve living comfort and therefore
are part of the utility function. If energy becomes more expansive they invest in thermal
insulation measures, which is considered to be a pure substitution of energy. Using the same
parameter . in equations (1), (2) and (5) will make the model tractable. 
The environmental stock can be thought of as having some natural level r if there is no
pollution. Pollution, which diminishes environmental qualities, is proportional to energy
production. This is expressed by the pollution coefficient CO2, which is multiplied by the
quantity of energy use to express the contribution to pollution (dropping the country index
henceforth):
 is energy production delivered to domestic and foreign consumers. The pollution (c  xEx)e
coefficient  is given at constant values because there are no filters or substitutes available. CO2     
7The modelling work takes into account several considerations explained extensively in the
WP version; see pages 7 and 8 there. 
     
8We follow Pissaridis (1990, chap.1) with a slightly different notation. For a condensed
introduction see the appendix.
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The difference between the natural level r and the vector product results in the environmental
stock E in (6), where v is a parameter. 
The energy tax will be modelled as a specific tax in accordance with the EC proposal.
7
This means that the firm must pay a tax t to the government for each unit (ton of carbon) of
environmental rights to pollute, CO2. Tax payments are described in the following equation:
If the coefficient CO2 is defined as tons of carbon per unit of energy quantity to which it is
multiplied, then t is the ECU price for the pollution of a ton of carbon, which is 35 ECU in the
EC proposal. Taxing use of energy is an alternative that will be written as an element of the
budgets with  as the tax rate per GJ of energy type i. For simplicity we set v=1.  2
Agents budgets
Producer k - where k = 1, ..., r is a certain value of i - has the following profits from revenues
minus costs:
The first term is deliveries to domestic households, the second is exports; the sr -term is an
investment subsidy for buying energy-saving technologies; term four, the t-term, is the tax for
a ton of carbon emission; the 2 -term is a positive or negative tax (subsidy) for energy use, which
is negative in case of non-externality types like wind and sun. Energy is measured in gigajoule,
GJ.   is an ad valorem subsidy to wages and   is a specific subsidy to wages. The last term sw1 sw2
consists of
8 expected real hiring costs , ! as a discount rate, b as a breaching or separation rate
and  as ratio of the rates of vacancies and unemployment, q() as the probability of the firm to
find a worker for a vacancy. Multiplication of real hiring costs by the price of the good in
question (for k g r), is necessary here because all other expressions are also expressed in nominal
terms. All non-energy, energy and energy-saving-technology producers have such a profit
function.
Households     
9Unemployment benefits received and premiums on unemployment insurance drop out in the
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The first term is wage income. The second and third terms are consumption of domestic and
imported goods respectively. The fourth term is the carbon tax payments imposed on households.
The fifth term is the energy tax. The sixth term consists of subsidies for energy-saving
purchases.
9 Households differ from firms in that they do not explicitly change energy coefficients
but instead are assumed to buy energy-saving technologies instead of energy.
The government budget is assumed to be balanced
Energy is assumed to be imported indirectly; we therefore we do not model import taxes on
energy explicitly. The first line of equation (10) contains energy and carbon tax revenues from
firms and households. The second line contains subsidies for retrofitting measures - paid to firms
and households -  and wages.
Current account 
Exports equal imports because debt and interest payments are assumed to be absent. m is a
dummy. If energy is imported it is one, if energy is completely produced domestically it is zero.
In different parts of the paper we will make different assumptions on m.
Equilibrium
Labour market equilibrium requires that labour demand for output production,   including M
j
Lj
energy production and production of energy-saving intermediates, must equal equilibrium
employment (1-u)L, where u is the rate of unemployment and L is the labour force. The labour
market is therefore characterized by:
3. The decision of the household
The household is assumed to optimize based on expectations and policy announcement
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Given employment and policy variables t, 2, and sr the household chooses consumption of all
goods including energy and retrofitting measures. Due to the basic decision that the
environmental problem is tackled by taxes the household cannot choose the environmental
variable E, which therefore will be a pure externality to the household. The first-order conditions
are the budget constraint and
The interpretations are as follows: for non-energy products we have the usual condition that
marginal utility equals the price times the value of income. For energy products the tax on CO2
is also a cost element and so is the specific energy tax. For energy-saving products, a subsidy for
buying energy-saving products is subtracted from the price.
Impact effects of energy policy on households' energy consumption 
Next we discuss the impact of energy-policy measures on households at prices that have not
already adjusted to the new equilibrium, the so called 'impact effect'. The reason for this
procedure is that most investigations in the literature present the new equilibrium solution after
the introduction of the new policy. However, we do not know how long the adjustment process
takes until the new equilibrium is reached and what the path to the new equilibrium will be at
least in more complex and realistic models. The impact effect tells what the first reaction of
individuals is.
In (13)-(16) the consumer prices (henceforth indexed by an upper index c) are related to
producer prices in the following manner:     
10These authors present many more results for alternative econometric methods. 
     
11The difference between the results of Deaton and Brenton seems to be rather extreme and
supposedly stems from the different methods as discussed in footnote 3 in Brenton (1994) and
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For a sufficiently large  number of firms the inverse price elasticity of demand converges towards
the last term, (1 - .) (see Helpman and Krugman 1985, Chap.6). 
The percentage change of consumer demand if the ad valorem subsidy for energy saving
purchases is changed can be computed as:
A percentage change in the specific tax on energy can be shown to generate a percentage change
in its consumption of: 
An introduction of a carbon tax starting from level zero generates a percentage change of
consumption of:
To compute the effects as expressed in (20)-(22), data on consumer price elasticities   would 0cp,i
be necessary on the household level. Unfortunately these are not available for energy-saving
products. Long-run price elasticities for residential aggregate energy demand in EU countries are
between - o.23 and -1.40 in Brenton (1994), Kouris (1983) and Mittelstädt (1983). Short-run
elasticities are much smaller. Income elasticities are between .49 and 2.43 with most of the
estimates being in the neighbourhood of 1. For dis-aggregated fuels we have estimates by
Maddala et al. (1997), Brenton (1994) and from Deaton (1975, based on British data).  In
Maddala et al. (1997) they are between -.83 and 1.328 in the short run for electricity and .048 to
.037 for gas. In Deaton (1975) we find income elasticities between -4 for coal and +3.7 for
electricity and price elasticities between +2 for coal and -2.9 for gas. In Maddala et al. (1997)
short-run price elasticities range from -.158 to -.214 for electricity and -.092 to -.177 for gas.
10
In Brenton (1994) we find compensated own price elasticities between -.65 for electricity in
Denmark and -.87 in Spain and expenditure elasticities of about unity for all countries and fuels.
11sophisticated discussion with respect to the reliability of these estimates. 
10
Long-run price elasticities for gas and electricity are between -0.2 and -4.6 according to a
summary of old literature in Li and Maddala (1999); for the short run the corresponding values
are between -0.05 and -0.9. 
We can only compute the effects modelled above for different values of the elasticities
. We use alternative values of uncompensated price elasticities   = -1.1, -2, -4, -10. 0cp,i 0cp,i
Sectoral elasticities on the highly aggregated level are lower because inter-fuel substitution
vanishes in the aggregation. But even on the level of single fuels the data reflect aggregates
across firms and therefore exclude the effects on price elasticities of inter-firm competition.
Remember that for monopoly prices to exist price elasticities have to be smaller than minus one.
Otherwise monopoly profits could be infinitely high, a situation that is hardly realistic.
For a scenario on (20) we use an ad valorem investment subsidy of 10%, 25% and 50%
respectively. The results for (20) are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
The subsidy elasticity of household demand for energy-saving products
0cs,r 





-1.1 .12 .36 1.1
-2 .22 .66 2
-4 .44 1.33 4
-10 1.1 3.33 10
The interpretation of results in Table 1 are as follows. Increasing the subsidy for energy saving
purchases by 1%,e.g., from 25% to 25,25% increases the demand for energy saving products by
x%, where x is the number in Table 1. If, for example, the subsidy is 50%, a change to 50,50%
increases the demand for energy-saving products by a percentage equal to the price elasticity (see
last column). With low price elasticity -1.1 and only 10% subsidy a change to a 10,1% subsidy
increases the demand by .12% = 1,2 
o/oo. The higher the level of the subsidy and the elasticity
assumed, the stronger the effect of a 1% increase of that subsidy. The reason is that for each ECU
a 1% increase in the ad valorem subsidy implies that the money value of the 10, 25, and 50%
subsidy is 1, 2.5 or 5 ECU cent respectively - which means that a larger amount of money is
involved. However, the range for   is rather broad: it goes from .1 to 10. Sectoral price 0cs,i
elasticities and those for household panels (see SEO 1992) are even lower than those used here
for households. In that case an elasticity of unity will only be reached for a subsidy higher than
50%.
Next we look at the effect of a carbon tax on households' demand for energy. We have
price data (see Europäische Gemeinschaften 1994) and carbon emission coefficients (see IPCC
Draft) for natural gas and heating gas oil. The EC average price for natural gas is 13 ECU per
gigajoule (GJ). This is also the price for Germany. The emission coefficient is .02 ton carbon per11
GJ (ton C/GJ). For heating gas oil (residential fuel oil) the average price is 12 ECU/GJ. This is
also the price for the Netherlands, Spain and France). The emission coefficient for heating gas
oil is .015 ton C/GJ. EC average prices for electricity are 23 ECU/GJ, which is also the price for
Spain and Belgium, but emission coefficients are not available. With a carbon tax of 35 ECU per
tonC as suggested by the EC proposal mentioned above, these (all taxes included) prices become
(13 + 35 x 0.015) ECU =  13,7 ECU and (12+35 x 0.015) ECU =12.525 ECU. The increase in
the price is therefore .7 ECU per GJ natural gas and .525 ECU per GJ  heating gas oil which is
a price increase of roughly 5% induced by the carbon tax alone. In Table 2 we summarize the
percentage changes in consumption, dc/c = dtCO2i/p
c, of natural gas and heating gas oil from a
carbon tax, dt, of ECU 20, 35, 50 and 100 for the same elasticity as in the above scenarios
derived from equation (22) based on price effects alone. Income effects and cross-price
elasticities from taxes on other fuels will be discussed separately below. 
Table 2
Impact effects of a carbon tax on private households change in consumption, dce/ce, of
natural gas and heating gas oil
Natural gas
carbon tax (ECU/ ton) 20 35 50 100
0cp,e
-1.1 -.034, -.06 -.08 -.17
-2 -.06, -.108 -.154 -.31
-4 -.12, -.216 -.308 -.62
-10 -3., -.54 -.77 -1.55
Heating gas oil
carbon tax (ECU/ ton) 20 35 50 100
0cp,e
-1.1 -.028, -.048 -.069 -.14
-2 -.05, -.0875 -.125 -.25
-4 -.1. -.175 -.25 -.5
-10 -.25, -.438 -.625 -1.25
In Brenton (1994),  Hermes (1993) and the summary of Li and Maddala (1999) and Maddala et
al. (1997) (compensated own price) elasticities for household aggregates in the short run are
below unity. Elasticities in SEO (1992) for gas are also below one percent. The use of lower
values will make the conclusion drawn below even stronger.
A carbon tax of 35 ECU, inducing a 5% price increase, will decrease demand for natural12
gas and heating gas oil by 6% and 4,8% (underlined number in Table 2) respectively under a price
elasticity of -1.1 if the effect on substitutes - some of which have to bear a carbon tax as well -
is ignored. Price elasticities reported in the literature are at the lower end of the above scenario.
Table 3
Impact effects of an energy tax on private households percentage change in




.3 .7 1.0 1.4
0cp,e
-1.1 -.025, -.06 -.08 -.118
-2 -.048 -.1 -.15 -.22
-4 -.09, -.21 -.3 -.43




.3 .7 1.0 1.4
0cp,e
-1.1 -.028, -.06 -.06 -.13
-2 -.05, -.117 -.17 -.23
-4 -.1, -.23 -.33 -.47
-10 -.25, -.58 -.83 -1.16
Electricity
energy tax
(ECU per GJ) 
.3 .7 1.0 1.4
0cp,e
-1.1 -.014, -.03 -.05 -.06
-2 -.026 -.06 -.09 -.12
-4 -.052 -.12 -.17 -.24
-10 -.13 -.3 -.43 -.61
Impact effects of an energy tax on energy consumption are considered in Table 3. Under
the EC proposal there will be a change of the energy tax, , of .7 ECU per Gigajoule. Table 3 d213
contains  scenarios for the change in consumption dce/ce =   of formula (21) with energy 0cp,ed2/p
c
e
tax change,   varying from .3 to 1.4, i.e from less than half to twice the amount contained in the d2
EC proposal. Gigajoule prices   corresponding to that formula are 13 ECU for natural gas, 12 p
c
i
ECU for heating  gas oil and 23 ECU for electricity, all of which are EC average prices taken from
Europaeische Gemeinschaft (1994).
Under the EC proposal and the lowest (absolute) price elasticity, 1.1, the percentage
change of GJ consumption of natural gas, heating gas oil and electricity will be 6%, 6% and 3%
respectively if income and cross-price effects from taxes on other fuels are ignored. For electricity
this value has been obtained under the assumption that there is an energy tax only at the level of
households. These values will be different if coal and other fuels are used and taxed on the input
level. In this case there can be a carbon and an energy tax on inputs for producing electricity.
The upper bound of an impact effect of an introduction of the EC proposal - still
postponing discussion of income and cross-price effects generated by taxes on other fuels - can
be obtained from adding up the percentage values of the 35-column of Table 2 and the .7 column
of Table 3. For alternative elasticity values of demand with respect to price this yields the results
of Table 4.
Table 4
Impact effect of an introduction of the EC proposal on energy consumption
0cp,i -1.1 -2 -4 -10
dc/c
1 -.12 -.21 -.43 -1.1
dc/c
2 -.11 -.21 -.41 -.926
1 for natural gas and   2 for heating gas oil.
Deaton (1975) finds an elasticity of -2.9 for gas demand in Britain. Applying that value here the
impact effect would be roughly a 30% demand reduction as the starting point for analysing the
price effect of a 10% price increase from carbon and energy taxes according to Table 4. To do so,
the following modifications are necessary: 
i) These effects have been calculated using the EU average price of 13 ECU for natural
gas and 12 ECU for heating gas oil when doing the division in the formula presented above.
However, households pay higher prices in almost all countries. Dividing by higher prices reduces
the effects of the above computations. In some cases the effects are reduced by more than one
half.
 ii) In Mittelstädt (1983) short-run elasticities of prices are about 1/4 of the long-run
elasticities reducing this number from 30% to a 7.25% reduction of demand for natural gas and
heating gas oil.
iii) Other energy forms also have to bear these taxes and therefore cross-price elasticities
will soften this effect. Therefore these are upper limits for single energy forms. 
iv) All results from Tables 2-4 are extremely sensitive to the values of the tax rates, the
price elasticities and the price paid. 
The income effect alone will be small: If a household spends as much as 1/3 of  income
on housing and 20% of that on energy then the energy share of total household expenditure is 6%.14
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A price increase of 10% decreases his real income by .6%. With an income elasticity of unity the
income effect will decrease demand by (-.6%). Even if the income elasticity is at the highest level
that can be found, 2.4, the demand decrease will be only 1.44%. 
If the mixture of energy and carbon taxes keeps the structure of demand approximately constant
and the price and income elasticities are at the upper value of the estimated ranges -1.4 and 2.4
respectively - the price increase of 10% and the income decrease of .6% decrease energy demand
by 15.5%. This is the uppermost level of possible demand reductions. Most estimates in Kouris
(1983), Mittelstädt (1983), Brenton (1994),  Li and Maddala (1999) and Maddala et al. (1997) are
half that size. This is leading to a long-run effect of a 7.7 % energy demand reduction from
households from the EC proposal values reached at the end of the "phasing in". With short-run
price elasticities of -.2 and an income elasticity of 1 (taken from the same literature and applied
to the price increase of 10% and the income decrease of .6%) the reduction in energy demand will
be 2% + .6% = 2.6% in the short run. This is much less than the reduction in energy demand
during recessions. Clearly, for less CO2 intensive energy forms than natural gas and heating gas
oil the price increase is lower. For more CO2 intensive energy forms the price increase is higher,
but this is mainly coal for which there are special rules of the game anyway. All in all, given the
necessity to protect the environment, the reduction of  competitiveness of energy, compared to
other products, seems to be at a minimum.     
4. The decision of monopolistically competitive producers
Producers choose: i) supply quantities  ; ii) purchases of energy and energy-saving xkck  xkEx
intermediates where energy-saving purchases reduce the energy coefficients according to (5); iii)
labour demand   from (3). The problem of the firm k then is to maximize profits as defined in Lk
equation (8) subject to equations (3), and domestic and foreign demand functions. Inserting (3),
(4) and (5) into the profit function (8), yields the unconstrained profit function to be maximized:
The first-order conditions for firms are (3), (4), (5) and (with k = 1, ..., e-1,  r,  i.e. for non-energy
firms)
The interpretation of the first-order conditions is as follows. Equation (23) states that marginal
revenue equals  marginal costs.   and energy taxes increase marginal costs and wage subsidies CO2     
12Although the price also appears in the valuation of the hiring costs, the firm is assumed not
to take into account that it might have any impact on this valuation. That price is also the price
of all other goods except for good r. 
     
13Dynamic investment effects are discussed in section 7 of the working paper version.
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decrease marginal costs.
12  (24) states that the value of subsidies plus the value of the reduction
of the energy coefficients equal the price paid for the energy-saving technologies. It follows from
(24) that all firms generate the same product gk ’xk through their technology choice. Due to the
specification of (5), equation (24) generates a constant inverse price elasticity of xrk, which is the
same as for all other goods. Energy is assumed to be imported in this section and the rest of the
paper. 
5. Policies when competitiveness is guaranteed
The implications of energy and carbon taxes on firms' and households' behaviour can now be
considered. Marginal revenue equals marginal cost, leading to a price
The impact of a change of carbon and energy taxes and wage subsidies on marginal cost is
Energy and carbon taxes on the one hand provide an incentive to reduce energy coefficients and
therefore decrease marginal costs. On the other hand, for given energy coefficients, they increase
marginal costs whereas wage subsidies decrease marginal costs. Wage subsidies are therefore an
instrument to compensate firms in a way that potentially leaves their marginal cost position
unaffected by carbon and energy taxes. Subsidies on energy-saving measures don't have this
positive effect because they decrease fixed costs directly and energy input coefficients and
marginal costs indirectly. However, if marginal costs are kept constant to ensure international
competitiveness and therefore prices,  output and labour demand are not decreased by carbon and
energy taxes (see Figure 1). The only effect then is to reduce energy input coefficients and
pollution. This latter effect, of course, is absent  under an exemption from a carbon tax - in the
model above and also empirically (see Denis and Koopman 1995) -  unless there are subsidies for
energy-saving measures.
13 
A way to reduce pollution further if wage subsidies keep marginal costs non-increasing
is to pay energy-saving subsidies as well. All this raises the crucial question whether their is
enough money from energy and carbon taxes to keep marginal costs constant except for the effect
of paying subsidies for energy-saving investments. This question can be analysed as follows.
All policy measures that change marginal cost in this model are assumed to start at value16
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zero, which implies  . Inserting this into dMC = 0 dt 
 t, d2i 
 2, dsw1 
 sw1, dsw2 
 sW2
yields the condition for constant marginal costs or an unchanged competitive position of a firm:
Marginal tax payments by the firm diminished by the reduction of the energy input coefficient
must equal marginal subsidies received for wages if the competitive position has to be unchanged.
Multiplying by   and summing over all firms k yields the condition for an unchanged xk
competitive position for the economy that can be compared to the budget of the government:
(26) says that to keep international competitiveness constant requires that the amount of carbon
and energy taxes paid by the firms diminished by the value of reduced energy coefficients is equal
to the amount of wage subsidies on variable labour cost. We look at the government budget to see
what remains in the budget after these transactions are carried out. Rewriting the budget constraint
of the government after replacement of   by (3) yields: Lk     
14This is the case because of the first term in the equation, which is positive. To this extent
MC is decreased and compensation on labour cost can be lower than the tax burdens. 
     
15Newell et al. (1999) provide evidence that energy prices do not affect the rate of overall
innovation but only the direction of innovation. With the rate of overall innovation unaffected
by energy subsidies and taxes it seems unnecessary to model endogenous growth rates here and
17




xek  tc e CO2  2 ce
	 sr pr (M
k
xrk  cr) 	 [ sw1 w sw2]M
k













Cancelling terms in (10') which add up to zero according to (26) yields
If the competitive position of firms has to be unaffected, then (more than)
14 the sum of carbon and
energy tax revenues paid by households can be used for subsidies on energy-saving investments
or to subsidize fixed labour costs. If households subsidizing firms’ fixed labour costs is held to
be undesirable from a political point of view there is a clear policy rule for C02 and competition
policy: the amount of carbon and energy tax revenues paid by firms can be used to subsidize
variable labour costs, fixed costs going without subsidies, and the amount of carbon and energy
tax revenues paid by households should be used to subsidize energy-saving measures of firms and
households. An important analytical implication of this rule is that rebated revenues from carbon
and energy taxes on firms serve the competitiveness goals by holding marginal costs constant and
the environmental goal by reducing energy coefficients, whereas carbon and energy taxes of
households serve the   goal via subsidies for energy-saving investments. Alternatively, if CO2
marginal costs are allowed to decrease by the change in the energy coefficient when energy tax
revenues paid by firms are exactly rebated to them,  the first term in (10'’) drops out and the rules
formulated above are slightly modified quantitatively but not principally. Taxes on carbon and
energy use and subsidies for investment in energy-saving technologies help to decrease  marginal
cost and therefore increase competitiveness (see Figure 2). In sum, subsidies to energy-saving
investments are not contradictory with respect to   policy and competitiveness, whereas CO2
environmental taxes need compensation by wage subsidies to avoid negative effects on marginal
costs or allow slightly positive ones. 
   A look at formulas (23) and (24) indicates that there are two complementary ways to have
environmental policy without endangering international competitiveness on average. First,  raise
environmental taxes on firms and rebate the revenue as wage subsidies. Obviously, this policy
would give an incentive to use energy-saving technologies according to equation (24) whereas
marginal cost other than those from changing energy-coefficients could be kept constant on
average. Without adding new constraints that are unmentioned so far, energy coefficients could
be driven down very far in this way, keeping in mind that our static model
15 brings this effecta static model is complicated enough to derive the essential results. 
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completely into the present. In reality this will be stretched out over many years because technical
progress is a slow process. Second, tax households and subsidize energy-saving investments of
households and firms. This also would bring down marginal costs by decreasing energy
coefficients. Therefore it could be used in addition to the first approach.
What are the limits to these policies? Some economists have argued that mixing
environmental policy and wage policy is not in accordance with ‘good economic order’. We do
not pursue this line of research. Others would not like tax burdens to be increased; they would
either suggest to reduce other taxes or to rebate the tax revenue, e.g., raised from households to
households. This is a debate that touches the question of the design of optimal tax systems. Of
course this can also not be done in this paper. But it seems to be in accordance with optimal
taxation systems that we will use below the textbook structure of taxing the dirty or polluting
activity and subsidize the good or less polluting alternative.
Politicians have detected a different problem related to equations (5) and (23). Firms
would enjoy the same rates of subsidization of wages, but their energy coefficients are different,
which means that they have different marginal cost increases from environmental taxes. By
implication, firms with high energy input coefficients have increases in their marginal costs and
therefore a loss in competitiveness. Although others must have a corresponding gain, politicians
are afraid that the structural change involved might increase unemployment. There are two ways
out of this problem. One of them is to politically muddle through, giving energy-intensive firms
exemptions from environmental taxes, which of course strongly weakens the environmental
effects of the policy and results in a strongly political determination of the allocation. The other
way is to abandon environmental taxes on firms altogether, thus getting rid of the necessity to pay
wage subsidies. Environmental policy then is made by taxing households, the beneficiaries of19
environmental policies, and giving subsidies to energy-saving investments to firms and
households. We next explain that, with this policy, substitution is limited to the household part
of the demand side whereas it leans on energy-saving investments of firms and households.     
We will look in more detail at substitution on the production side of the economy because
much of the literature has been based on substitution ideas. It is well known from the discussion
on capital-energy substitution that the data used in empirical  work are highly aggregated.
Substitution is a composite effect of three sources: i) shifts in the structure of the activities from
energy-intensive to less energy-intensive activities; ii) energy-saving technical progress; iii)
substitution in the narrow sense of the word, i.e. along an isoquant at the product level. With
highly aggregated data it is impossible to disentangle these three effects. Therefore, not only is
capital-energy substitution an un-clarified issue (see J.L. Solow 1987) but so is the energy-labour
substitution. A policy that holds the international competitiveness of sectors constant instead of
building on sectoral shifts has to rely on the other sources. Moreover, even if energy-intensive
sectors would not be protected against loss of competitiveness one should keep in mind that
during the oil crises "the long-established trend of labour-intensive industries toward declining
relative economic importance accelerated" (Marlay 1984, p.1279). Oil-price  increases could have
theoretically induced energy-labour substitution and capital-energy intensive sectors should have
declined, but this didn't happen. Therefore it is much less likely to occur under a   policy that CO2
increases energy prices much less than the oil crises did. Therefore, the first of the three sources
of substitution is not available if sectors are protected against losing competitiveness via taxation,
and substitution in the narrow sense, i.e. along an isoquant on the product level, is not a reliable
way in itself. The only remaining basis for   policy is energy-saving investments because CO2
"declining relative economic importance of industries intensive in their use of labour and energy,
(is) suggesting a role for advanced technologies aimed at improving industrial productivity" and
" to the extent that energy is an important factor in the costs of production, such  technologies
offer potentially significant competitive advantages" (Marlay, 1984, p.1282). Reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions and unemployment therefore has to rely on investment in energy-saving
technologies of firms and households, on substitution of households and all of the implied general
equilibrium effects. Tax revenues should therefore be recycled in the form of subsidies for these
investments when competitiveness is a political tabo and muddling through is not accepted as a
systematic approach. These investments decrease marginal cost, increase production and labour
demand in a clean way because energy coefficients are lower than without this policy (Figure 2).
The advantage of subsidies from the point of view of having three imperfections -
environmental externalities, unemployment and monopolistic competition - is that they are all
affected positively by the subsidy. Suggestions for alternative instruments will also have to be
evaluated with respect to these imperfections in an x-best setting. It should be kept in mind that
in this proposal subsidies to firms are financed by taxing the polluting households. The principle
of causation is therefore applied to households and also internationally because each country pays
for its own pollution reduction. Up to the exception made for producers in order to preserve
competitiveness, this follows the textbook principle to tax the polluter and subsidize the clean
alternative. This principle has been successfully applied to car pollution before (see Kemp 1995).
Of course, adding an additional restriction such as 'international competitiveness' has some costs
in making an instrument a bit more costly. However, in a world with many imperfections one has
to make sure that improving on one imperfection is not made too much at the cost of worsening
other imperfections. The international competitiveness constraint in this paper excludes cost     
16Investment subsidies to preserve firms survival have also been proposed in a different setting
by Carraro and Siniscalco (1992). 
     
17For second-order conditions and technical details of this section see the appendix.
     
18See equation (A.1) of the appendix.
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increasing measures and therefore makes subsidies preferable to taxes.
16
Moreover, subsidies in one country or region may induce another country to give subsidies
to a close competitor to preserve his position in the competition. Thus subsidies provide an
incentive to foreign countries to contribute to GHG policy by using international competition as
an incentive mechanism for the participation in contributions to the solution of a global common
problem.
6. General equilibrium 
So far we have shown on the firm level that subsidies for energy-saving investments will reduce
energy-input coefficients, monopolistic prices and increase labour demand. In this section we will
show
17 that these results also hold on the general equilibrium level, thus reducing unemployment
and the monopolistic inefficiency when using subsidies for energy-saving investment. The essence
of this line of thought is not that a substantial contribution to the unemployment problem can be
expected. Rather it is that environmental policy can be initiated without aggravation of the
unemployment problem. The results derived in this section are collected in Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3
In the right part the Beveridge curve is drawn. To determine the unemployment rate and its change
after the introduction of subsidies for energy-saving investments, we examine the two curves of
the left part. The upward sloping BB curve is the bargaining curve as it is known from Pissaridis
(1990)
18: the higher the vacancy/unemployment ratio the larger the real wage from the bargaining
process. In the appendix we show that this curve is also valid for this model. 
The falling curve of the left quadrant is more complicated to get. To derive it we first show
that the two first-order conditions and the zero-profit condition of the retrofitting sector, equations
(23), (24) and (8) for k =r with t=2=sw1=sw2=0 are three equations that determine the price, the
quantity and the retrofitting measures of that sector as functions of the vacancy/ unemployment
ratio, the subsidy and the price of the other sectors, pk. This is formally done in the appendix. In
figure 4 we summarize the results, which can be explained as follows. 
INSERT FIGURE 4
Figure 4a shows that the price for retrofitting measures is an increasing function of unit labour
costs. The reason is that marginal and fixed labour costs both increase and therefore, under zero-
profit conditions, the price must go up. The increasing curve is shifted down by an increase of
subsidies for retrofitting measures, because subsidies decrease the fixed costs for energy-saving
technologies and increase the incentive to reduce energy-input coefficients, thus reducing
marginal costs. Therefore prices decrease because fixed and marginal costs decrease. 
Figure 4b shows the profit-maximizing quantity of the retrofitting sector. As prices and21
marginal costs go up with unit labour costs, quantities decrease. Subsidies for energy-saving
technologies are decreasing marginal costs and therefore increase the quantity, which is captured
by an upward shift of the falling curve.     
Figure 4c shows the quantity, xrr, of retrofitting measures that are applied in the retrofitting
sector itself. It is a falling function of labour unit costs, because quantities are a falling function
of labour unit costs and lower (higher) quantities provide a stronger (weaker)  incentive to reduce
energy-input coefficients. 
All these three arguments captured on the vertical axes of figure 4 are functions of the
vacancy/unemployment rate, the goods price pk, the subsidy sr, and the energy price pe. What we
use  in the next step is the price function pr=pr(, sr, pk, pe), which is part of the first-order
condition of all other sectors k gr. 
Next we consider the sectors kgr. The two first-order conditions and the zero-profit
condition (23), (24) and (8) are three equations for pk, xk, xrk, depending on the
vacancy/unemployment ratio, , subsidies, sr, and energy prices pe. When looking at the sectoral
equilibrium, we take into account that a firm’s change in pk also changes the valuation of hiring
costs because all firms change the price. The results of the analysis is captured in Figure 5. pk
turns out to be an increasing function of the vacancy/ unemployment ratio, , which is shifted
down by the subsidy. 
INSERT FIGURE 5
Results for the quantities of output and retrofitting measures are ambiguous because of two
differences with the analysis of the r sector. First, a change in pk has an impact on hiring costs
which interacts with all other effects in a 3x3 system. Second, a change in the vacancy/
unemployment ratio not only effects pk directly but also indirectly via its effect on pr. Increased
unit labour costs and increased prices pr increase marginal costs and therefore should be expected
to decrease quantities of output and energy-saving investments. However, the price increase is an
upward shift of the demand function which also shifts up the marginal revenue function and
thereby induces higher quantities. The net effect could be clarified for the r sector but not under
the more involved circumstances of the analysis of the sectors kgr.
We use the wage as a numéraire and assume that all sectors have the same g function in
equation (5), the curve in figure 5. After turning this equation into a function into 1/pk, is exactly
the curve labelled FF that is falling in the upper quadrant of figure 3. Its intersection with the
bargaining curve determines the vacancy unemployment ratio. Actually we now have a 7x7
system where the seven equations are the two first-order conditions of the r sector and its zero-
profit conditions, and the respective conditions for the k sectors [(23), (24) and (8) for k=r and
kgr, counting them only once when talking of a 7x7 system)] and the bargaining equation. These
seven equations determine  pk, xk, xrk (for k= r and for kgr) and . Next, the Beveridge curve is
an additional equation from which we get the unemployment rate u. An increase in the subsidy
shifting up the FF curve in figure 3 corresponding to the downward shift in figure 5, increases
the tightness ratio , decreases unemployment. More employment then leads to more production
according to equation (12). Whether or not pollution will decrease depends on the net effect of
i) decreasing energy-input coefficients from higher energy-saving measures and ii) more output
from increased employment. This ambiguity, of course, arises from trying to use one instrument
in a way that three inefficiencies are improved in the first instance: environment, employment and
the monopolistic inefficiency. However, there is a widespread view that employment effects of
such policies are fairly small because the share of energy costs is very low. This gives the policy22
a chance to improve the environment. Whatever the result on the environment is, falling prices
stemming from an increase in the subsidy, increases households material well-being. But, of
course, it has to be financed leaving the net effect once again indeterminate. If foreign countries
do not have a similar policy the substitution effect drives relative demand towards the domestic
economy. This provides an incentive for foreign politicians to install a similar policy.   
 
7. Conclusion
This paper argues that a 'double dividend' under a competitiveness constraint is more likely to be
found in a policy that subsidizes energy-saving investments out of the revenues of a carbon/energy
tax than in a policy in which the revenues are exclusively used to reduce labour costs. Besides
reducing emissions directly, such a policy thus decreases marginal costs because firms reduce
energy use. Reduced marginal costs increase output and therefore employment, leaving the net
effect on emissions unclear unless output and employment effects are relatively weak.
Such policy is superior under the condition already agreed upon among EU politicians
(that the international competitiveness of branches and firms should not suffer from CO2
abatement policy) so that no sectoral shift occurs via eco-taxes. Given the limited opportunities
of substitution,  at least in the short run, and on the product level, we doubt that the standard
double-dividend story is convincing. In contrast, the energy-savings potentials are well known to
be quite large (see Marlay 1984, Blok et al. 1990 and Velthuijsen 1993). Investment in
energy-saving technologies is a road to GHG- emission reduction  without endangering
international competitiveness and employment of sectors.
The effects of the proposal are as follows:
i) Households pay energy and   taxes which are used for subsidies on energy-saving CO2
investments of firms or households. Under the EC proposal the price level effect of taxes is
roughly 10% for natural gas and heating gas oil. Substitution away from energy at the household
level is likely to occur but will be modest. Demand for energy-saving products will increase. The
effects are limited. The costs of the policy are spread over the entire population, the beneficiary
of GHG emission reduction.
ii) Subsidies for energy-saving investments reduce the fixed costs of production. As a
result marginal costs decrease, which leads to lower prices and higher employment, making fixed
costs per unit of output lower. Consequently, greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced if
employment effects are small enough, and employment will be marginally higher as well.
Energy-intensive sectors have a chance to become 'clean' without being the source of a new
employment problem. The decrease in marginal costs will lead to a decrease in prices. A reduction
of marginal costs will have a favourable impact on the competitiveness of firms, thus reducing
monopolistic inefficiency. Exports going from the EC to the rest of the world will benefit most
because they don't suffer from a decrease in demand induced by the income effects of energy and CO2
taxes unless the rest of the world is induced to undertake the same policy. This is another potential
advantage of this proposal, that the policy deadlock of "we do nothing if they do nothing" may
be broken. Moreover, countries who have disadvantages from such international competition
impacts may become more interested in finding a solution for the greenhouse effect in an
internationally coordinated way. This may speed up the process started in Kyoto. The US
government has invested already $6.3 billion over five years to encourage energy efficiency and
the use of cleaner energy sources. This amount is low  compared to the OECD estimate of $750     
19See Cooper 1998 p.77.
     
20See Jacoby, Prinn and Schalensee (1998) pp.61-66 for the need of R&D finances. Public
R&D budgets allocate more than five times as much money to nuclear energy ($5 billion) than
into research into renewables ($ 878 million). (The Economist June 14, 1997)
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billion yearly carbon tax revenues
19 and it seems to be available only for technology adoption. The
corresponding number for the Netherlands is 1 billion guilders per year. If this type of subsidy is
an essential part of a political equilibrium it should be possible to shift more money - also for
R&D of all useful sorts
20 - into this strategy. This could be considered a great improvement, if one
wants to buy more insurance again the GHG emissions risks than one has now. Moreover,
according to the concept explained in this paper they must be strong enough to generate an
incentive for countries to use positive incentives as well.
    iii) If politicians believe in energy-labour substitution at the product level or allow for
sectoral shifts, firms can be taxed for energy use and   pollution as well and the revenues CO2
could be used for employment  subsidies. This by itself could keep marginal cost on the firm level
constant in the short run.
In sum, subsidies on investment in energy-saving technologies paid out of carbon and
energy taxes of households are a way to stimulate competitiveness - reducing monopolistic
inefficiencies - and employment and achieve GHG emission reductions provided output and
employment effects are small, if policy makers want to safeguard competitiveness of energy-
intensive sectors. Moreover, subsidies may induce other countries to undertake a similar policy
and the process started in Rio and Kyoto may be speeded up. 
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Figure 3. The higher the tightness ratio  the lower the unemployment rate u and the
higher the bargained real wage (BB) and the prices set by firms (FF). 2728     
21If our model were of the endogenous growth type the division would not be by ! but rather
by !-g, where g is the steady state growth rate. A change in the growth rate would affect
employment via the so-called capitalization effect. However, as Newell et al. (1999) provide
evidence that energy prices do not affect this growth rate nothing would be changed here in a
model that has a specification that leaves g unaffected by energy prices and policies. Therefore
we limit our model to a static one.
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Appendix (not for publication)
Basics of search unemployment theory
From the Pissaridis (1990, chap.1) model we use the matching function m L = m(uL, vL ), where
L is the number of workers, u is the unemployment rate, v is the rate of vacancies and mL is the
number of matches produced by this function. The function is assumed to be increasing in both
arguments, concave and linearly homogenous. Defining  = v/u, division of the matching function
by vL yields q()= m(u/v,1) as the probability of a firm to find a worker for a vacancy and q()
= m/u = m(1, v/u) as the probability of an unemployed worker to find a job. A shock is a
percentage rate b at which (1-u)L employed workers loose their job by assumption in every period.
Therefore b(1-u)L workers go from a job into unemployment every period. On the other hand
q()uL unemployed workers expect to find a job each period. Labour market equilibrium is
defined as a situation where the numbers of workers going into and out of unemployment are
equal and expectations turn out to be true, i.e. b(1-u)L= q()uL.  Solving this equation for u
yields the Beveridge or UV curve (lower indices referring to variables indicate partial derivatives):
(1)









The present-discounted value of the expected income stream of an unemployed and an employed
worker, U and E respectively, are: U = [Z + q()(E-U)]/! and E=[W + b(U-E)]/!.
21 Z denotes
the unemployment benefit and E-U is the income difference an unemployed worker can gain by
finding a job with probability q(). W is the wage and U-E is the corresponding loss of a worker
from losing his job with probability b. Solving the second of the two equations for E yields E=
(W+bU)/(!+b). All these expressions here are defined in nominal terms. These two equations can
be solved for E and U explicitly:
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The present-discounted value of a vacancy is V = [- pk +q()(J-V)]/! . It consists of the nominal
hiring costs pk and the net return of transferring the vacancy V into a job with value J expected
with probability q().  ! is the discount rate. As the value of the vacancy is zero in equilibrium,
we get J = pk/ q(): the value of a job is equal to the vacant job costs pk multiplied by the
expected duration of the vacancy 1/q(). When considering the firms’ hiring costs it has to be
taken into account that the occupied job may be separated from the worker again with probability
b. The current value of the expected value of a job therefore is (! + b)J = (! + b)pk /q(). These
are labour costs that are added to the nominal wage received by the worker. Labour costs then
equal W + (! + b)pk /q(). Dividing the expression by the price of goods k yields the usual
expression in real terms.      
22This equation corresponds to equation 1.18 in Pissaridis 1990.
     
23This equation corresponds to equation 1.19 in Pissaridis 1990.
30
Pissaridis (1990) links the above to the neo-classical production function. Here we link
it to the model of this paper. If the temporary utility functions defined in the text are discounted
and integrated we may get the inter-temporal utility function  . 







It is well known from endogenous growth theory or the theory of optimal growth that, in the
absence of productivity growth, the value of consumption will be stationary and the interest rate
will equal the discount rate !. This is the shortest way to determine the interest rate. 
Workers and firms are assumed to determine the wage Wj by bargaining over rents. The
rents are Ej -U and Jj -V, the difference between income from being employed and being
unemployed, and the difference in value for a job and a vacancy. Hiring costs are obtained from
the zero-profit condition of a bargaining firm j as 
Jj = pk/ q( )= {[pkxk-(1-sr)prxrk-peg(xrk)xk]/(f+axk) - Wj}/(!+b)
Bargaining occurs through maximising the function (Ej -U)
￿ (Jj -V) 
1-￿ with respect to the wage Wj,
with  as the bargaining power of workers and 1- that of firms, V=0, Ej=[Wj + bU]/(!+b), U
according to the explicit solution given above. The result is that workers achieve a share  of the
sum of the rents:  Ej - U = (Ej - U + Jj - V). Insertion of the above expressions for all the terms
and solving for the wage yields
22
Wj= (1-)!U +  [pkxk-(1-sr)prxrk-peg(xrk)xk]/(f+axk)   with   !U=Z+pk/(1-),
where the last expression is obtained from insertion of Ej - U =  (Ej - U + Jj - V) and Jj = pk/
q() into 'U = [Z + q()(E-U)]. Insertion of !U into the wage equation yields
23 
Wj= (1-)Z +pk+  [pkxk-(1-sr)prxrk-peg(xrk)xk]/(f+axk)
It follows from the zero-profit condition that the fraction in the last term after the  equals wage
plus hirings costs. Therefore the equation can be re-written as 
Wj= (1-)Z +pk+ [W + (!+b)pk/q()]  
In equilibrium, bargained and market wages must be the same. Solving for W yields 
W = Z +  pk{[ q() + (!+b)]/q()}/(1-)
Dividing by pk yields the bargaining curve drawn in figure 3: 
W/pk = z +  {[ q() + (!+b)]/q()}/(1-), with z = Z/pk. (A.1)
If the exogenous unemployment benefit z is given in real terms then this is an equation in two31
variables: the real wage and the vacancy/unemployment ratio. 
The corresponding curve for the r-sector would be divided by pr instead of pk. That means
that in figure 3 the curves would be shifted by a pk/pr. It can be shown that this ratio is larger than
one. This means that the two intersecting curves would both be shifted to the left and intersect at
the same vacancy/ unemployment ratio. The reason why pk>pr is as follows (proof by
contradiction): In each sector we have pi= MCi/.. this means that equal MC in both sectors would
imply equal prices irrespective of the position of the demand curve; a demand curve that is at the
upper right of the other demand curve leads to higher quantities but not higher prices. The
retrofitting sector has higher demand because at hypothetically identical prices it has the same
demand from households and exports, but a demand from firms as well. Higher quantities,
however, imply higher energy demand and a stronger incentive to buy energy saving investment
goods, which in turn decrease energy-coefficients. therefore the retrofitting sector has lower
marginal costs and lower prices than the other sectors. This is an interesting result independent
of the context of the paper: higher demand may lead to lower prices when technology choice is
involved.
Second-order conditions
Second-order conditions require that the second derivatives with respect to the same variables are
negative. Moreover, the determinant of the Hessian of the profit function must be positive:
0
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Calculation of the determinant, using p’x= p(. -1), yields:
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Partial equilibrium of the sector for energy-saving technologies
Solving the zero-profit condition of sector r for its price pr - after setting all policy instruments
except for the subsidy equal to zero -, and replacing, first,  xr by xr = (1-sr)pr/[-g’(xrr)pe] from the
first-order condition concerning xrr, and second pr by its value from the first-order condition with
respect to xr, yields after some manipulation (with h as nominal hiring costs as defined in the text):
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The term in square brackets on the left-hand side is marginal costs. The function on the left hand
side is a falling function of xrr with vertical intercept [peae+(w+h)a]
2 /[.
2/(1-.)] drawn in figure
6. The right-hand side goes towards infinity for xrr 0. On the other hand, if xrr, - g’xrr. As
the right hand side comes from and goes to infinity it must have at least one minimum. Around
each minimum the curve has a u-shaped form. By implication, there is either no intersection or32
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there is an even number of intersections, half of which have a RHS curve falling at the
intersection point and the other half have a positive slope. The slopes of the curves can be
calculated as follows:
In the last derivative the first and the third of the three terms are negative whereas the second is
positive. Using the fact that the fixed cost term in square brackets can be rewritten as pr(1-.)xr
under a zero-profit constraint, and the fraction in the second term equals pr we show that the
second term is outweighed by the first term: 
- pe g’‘FC/ (1-sr) - pe g’[pegr+(w+h)a]/ . = - pe g’‘pr(1-.)xr/(1-sr)- pe g’pr =
 - xr/(1-sr)[ pe g’‘pr(1-.)+ peg’pr(1-sr)/xr]  = - xr/(1-sr)[pe g’‘pr(1-.)- (pe g’)
2]< 0 
In the last step the second-order condition for xrr has been used. The term in square brackets has
the sign of the second-order conditions of profit maximization and therefore the whole term is
negative. By implication the relevant intersection points are those where the RHS curve is falling.
In figure 6, where the special case with two intersection points is drawn this is the intersection
point which is more on the left. 
A subsidy for energy saving technologies shifts up the RHS curve and therefore increases
xrr as drawn in figure 6. This decreases energy-input coefficients in the first-order condition for
the quantity, xr, and therefore, given labour costs, it decreases pr: dpr /dxrr = peg’/. < 0.  The first-
order condition for xrr, solved for xr= (1-sr)pr (xrr)/[-g’(xrr)pe] can then be shown to prove that the
quantity of the energy-saving technologies is increased. dxr/dxrr turns out to be positive if the
second-order conditions are fulfilled and .1/2 (sufficient), which is assumed to be the case
henceforth.
Next we consider the impact of an increase in wage costs w+h. We find 
0LHS/0(w+h)= (1-.)2MCa/.
2> 0 and 0LHS/0(w+h)[(w+h)/LHS = 2(w+h)a/MC, which is larger
than unity if marginal labour costs (w+h)a is the larger part of marginal costs, i.e., larger than
marginal energy costs;
0RHS /0(w+h)= - peg’[f/(1-sr) - xrra/.] and 0RHS /0(w+h)[w+h)/RHS] <1 as RHS is linear in
w+h and pegr drops out in the derivation. By implication LHS is increased more strongly by an
increase of unit wage costs, d(w+h), than RHS is. Consequently xrr falls at the relevant
equilibrium when unit wage costs increase. By implication energy coefficients increase and so do
marginal costs as both its components go up and therefore prices are increased as well. To get the
impact on the profit-maximizing quantity we can again use xr= (1-sr)pr (xrr)/[-g’(xrr)pe] which
yields dxr/dxrr > 0 if the second-order conditions are fulfilled and .1/2 (sufficient). As xrr falls
xr also falls when unit wage costs are increased. All of these results are summarized in Figure 4a-
c. 33
What we need in the analysis of the other sectors is that pr is a function of wage costs,
subsidies and energy prices, with nominal unit hiring cost being a function of the vacancy/
unemployment ratio and goods prices pk: pr= pr[w+h(, pk), sr; pe]. To get the falling curve in the
upper quadrant of figure 3 we need a relation between pk and the vacancy/unemployment ratio and
we need to know how it shifts with changes in the subsidies. The analysis runs as follows.
Equilibrium of the other sectors   
The two first-order conditions and the zero-profit condition, (23), (24), (8) for kgr, using the wage
as numéraire, forms  a system of three equations for the price, pk, the quantity, xk, and the
investment in energy-savings measures, xrk, all as functions of the vacancy/unemployment ratio,
, the subsidy sr, and energy prices pe. We first show for the partial equilibrium (where pr , and  pk
as the valuation of hiring costs is perceived to be given and constant) that subsidies increase the
investment in energy-saving measures for given . Solving the zero-profit condition for pk,
replacing xk by its value from the first-order condition for xrk , xk = (1-sr)pr/[-g’(xrk)pe], and
replacing marginal cost terms by pk., and eliminating pk by using the first-order condition for
output, we get an equation as in figure 6 for the r sector. Again the relevant equilibrium is found
by using second-order conditions. Again the subsidy shifts up the u-shaped function and increases
xrk.
Totally differentiating the three equations, the first-order conditions for xk, xrk and pk,
totally with respect to these three variables and with respect to , where the differentiation
includes a change in the valuation of the hiring costs with respect to pk, we get the following
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As the third element in the third row of the 3x3 matrix is positive, the determinant of this matrix
is positive whenever second-order conditions are fulfilled. Applying Cramer’s rule to get 0pk/ 0,
brings the third element of the vector of the right hand side into the position of the third row and
column. As this term is also positive, the  matrix obtained in this way, which can be called A3,




> 0 as both
determinants are positive. Vertical lines indicate that a determinant is considered. If the right hand
side of the system would be the differentiation of the system with respect to subsidies, we would
have the positive effect of subsidies on profits in the third position, with changing its sign when
bringing it to the right hand side. Applying Cramer’s rule again would bring this element into the




< 0. Similarly, one can show
0xk/0sr, whatever the sign of the effect 0xk/0 is.